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Environmental variability greatly influences the eco-evolutionary dynamics of a population, i.e. it affects how
its size and composition evolve. Here, we study a well-mixed population of finite and fluctuating size whose
growth is limited by a randomly switching carrying capacity. This models the environmental fluctuations be-
tween states of resources abundance and scarcity. The population consists of two strains, one growing slightly
faster than the other, competing under two scenarios: one in which competition is solely for resources, and
one in which the slow (“cooperating”) strain produces a public good that benefits also the fast (“freeriding”)
strain. We investigate how the coupling of demographic and environmental (external) noise affects the popula-
tion’s eco-evolutionary dynamics. By analytical and computational means, we study the correlations between
the population size and its composition, and discuss the social-dilemma-like “eco-evolutionary game” charac-
terizing the public good production. We determine in what conditions it is best to produce a public good; when
cooperating is beneficial but outcompeted by freeriding, and when the public good production is detrimental for
cooperators. Within a linear noise approximation to populations of varying size, we also accurately analyze the
coupled effects of demographic and environmental noise on the size distribution.
Keywords: population dynamics, evolution, ecology, fluctuations, cooperation dilemma, public goods
I. INTRODUCTION
The fate of populations is affected by a number of endlessly
changing environmental conditions such as the presence of
toxins, resources abundance, temperature, light, etc. [1, 2].
In the absence of detailed knowledge of how external fac-
tors vary, they are modeled as external noise (EN) shaping
the randomly changing environment in which species evolve.
The impact of fluctuating environments on population dynam-
ics has been studied in a number of systems [3–14], and sev-
eral evolutionary responses to exogenous changes have been
analyzed [15–21]. In finite populations, internal noise is an-
other important form of randomness, yielding demographic
fluctuations of stronger intensity in small populations than in
large ones. Internal noise (IN) is responsible for fixation [22–
24] (when one species takes over and others are wiped out)
and thus plays an important role in the evolution of a pop-
ulation’s composition. Ecological and evolutionary dynam-
ics are often coupled, through an interdependent evolution of
the population size and composition [25–31]. As a conse-
quence, environmental variability may affect the population
size and hence the demographic fluctuations intensity, thus
coupling EN and IN. The interdependence of environmental
noise and demographic fluctuations is particularly relevant for
microbial communities, whose properties greatly depend on
the population size and on the environment [1, 2]. These pop-
ulations often experience sudden environmental changes that
can drastically affect their size, e.g. by leading to popula-
tion bottlenecks under which the colony of reduced size is
more prone to fluctuations [32–35]. The coupling between
the different forms of randomness therefore generates feed-
back loops between socio-biological interactions and the en-
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vironment [32, 33, 36, 37], which results in fascinating eco-
evolutionary phenomena such as cooperative behavior. For in-
stance, experiments on Pseudomonas fluorescens showed that
the formation and sudden collapse of biofilms promotes the
evolution of cooperation [34, 35, 38]. In most studies, how-
ever, EN and IN are treated as uncoupled [4–14].
Recently, we introduced a model describing a fluctuat-
ing population—consisting of a fast strain competing with a
slow (cooperating) species, that can produce a public good—
evolving under a randomly switching carrying capacity [39].
In this model, demographic fluctuations are coupled to EN, re-
sulting in a significant influence on the species fixation prob-
ability and leading to noise-induced transitions of the popu-
lation size. In the context of the eco-evolutionary dynam-
ics of this model, here we introduce the theoretical concept
of “eco-evolutionary game” to characterize the emergence of
cooperation in populations of fluctuating size. We study the
correlations between the population size and its composition
and show that a social dilemma of sorts arises: while the pub-
lic good production increases the overall expected population
size, it also lowers the survival probability of cooperators. In
the biologically-inspired setting of a metapopulation of non-
interacting communities of varying size, we measure the suc-
cess of each species in the eco-evolutionary game in terms of
its expected long-term number of individuals. We thus deter-
mine the circumstances under which public good production
(cooperation) is detrimental or beneficial to cooperators, and
find the conditions in which it is best to produce the public
good. Furthermore, we have devised a linear noise approxi-
mation that allows us to accurately characterize the population
size distribution and noise-induced transitions in a population
whose size fluctuates under the joint effect of coupled demo-
graphic and environmental noise.
The next two sections establish our approach: In section
II, we introduce our stochastic model; in section III, we out-
line the properties of the fitness-dependent Moran model and
piecewise deterministic Markov processes associated with the
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FIG. 1: (a) Cartoon of the eco-evolutionary dynamics of the model: the population consists of strains S (◦) and F (•), subject to K(t) ∈
{K−,K+} that randomly switches, see (4). After each switch of K(t),N and x change: following aK− toK+ switch, N increases and the
intensity of the internal noise decreases; the opposite occurs following a K+ to K− switch. (b) Typical random switching of K(t) according
to (4). (c) Sample paths ofN(t) (gray, dashed line) and x(t) (blue, solid line), corresponding to the switching portrayed in (b). We notice that
x evolves much slower than N , see text. Parameters are (s, ν,K+,K−, b) = (0.02, 0.1, 450, 50, 0).
model, and review how to combine these to compute the
species fixation probabilities. In the following two sections,
we present our main results: Section IV is dedicated to the
correlations between the population size and its composition,
and to the discussion of the emergence of cooperative behav-
ior along with an “eco-evolutionary game” in a population of
fluctuation size; in section V, we study the population size
distribution within a linear noise approximation. Our con-
clusions are presented in Sec. VI. Additional information is
provided in the Supplementary Material (SM) [40].
II. MODEL
As in our recent work [39], we consider a well-mixed pop-
ulation of fluctuating size N(t) = NS(t) + NF (t), consist-
ing of NS individuals of species S and NF of species, or
strain, F [42]. The fast-growing strain F has fitness fF = 1,
whereas the slow-growing strain S has a slightly lower fitness
fS = 1 − s, where 0 < s ≪ 1 denotes the (weak) selec-
tion intensity. At time t the fraction of S individuals in the
population is x(t) = NS(t)/N(t) and the average population
fitness is f¯ = xfS + (1 − x)fF = 1 − sx = 1 + O(1).
Here, the evolution of the population size N(t) is coupled to
the internal composition x(t) by a global growth rate g(x),
and its growth is limited by a logistic death rateN/K(t) [25–
27, 39]. The carrying capacity K(t) is a measure of the pop-
ulation size that can be supported, and is here assumed to
vary in time, see below. We specifically focus on two im-
portant forms of global growth rates: (i) the pure resource
competition scenario g(x) = 1, in which x andN are coupled
only through fluctuations; and (ii) the public good scenario in
which g(x) = 1 + bx, corresponding to a situation where S
individuals are “cooperators” [25–27, 41] producing a public
good (PG) that enhances the population growth rate through
the benefit parameter 0 < b = O(1), here assumed for sim-
plicity to be independent of s. In the PG scenario, N and
x are explicitly coupled, since the changes in the size of the
population (ecological dynamics) and those in its composition
(evolutionary dynamics) are interconnected. This interplay es-
tablishes a form of “eco-evolutionary dynamics” [28, 29]. It is
worth noting that, as customary in evolutionary game theory,
we assume that mutation rates of the strains are negligible, and
we thus characterize the population evolutionary dynamics in
terms of the fixation properties [24, 41].
In this context, the population size and composition change
according to the continuous-time birth-death process [26, 68,
69]
NS/F
T+
S/F−−−→ NS/F + 1 and NS/F
T−
S/F−−−→ NS/F − 1, (1)
with transition rates
T+S/F = g(x)
fS/F
f¯
NS/F and T
−
S/F =
N
K(t)
NS/F . (2)
We model environmental randomness by letting the car-
rying capacity K(t) switch randomly between K+ (abun-
dant resources) and K− < K+ (scarce resources), see figure
1(a,b). We assume that K(t) switches at rate ν, according
to a time-continuous symmetric dichotomous Markov noise
(DMN) [43, 44, 47] ξ(t) ∈ {−1,+1} (or random telegraph
noise):
ξ
ν−→ −ξ , (3)
The stationary symmetric DMN has zero-mean 〈ξ(t)〉 = 0
and autocorrelation 〈ξ(t)ξ(t′)〉 = exp(−2ν|t − t′|) (〈·〉 de-
notes the ensemble average over the environmental noise) [43,
44]. This is a colored noise with a finite correlation time
1/(2ν) [43, 44, 47–50], see section SM-I in SM [40]. As a
result, the fluctuating carrying capacity reads
K(t) =
1
2
[(K+ +K−) + ξ(t)(K+ −K−)] , (4)
and endlessly switches betweenK+ andK−.
3In what follows, we consider that the DMN is stationary:
〈ξ(t)〉 = 0 for t ≥ 0. Hence, the initial carrying capacity is
eitherK− orK+ with probability 1/2, and the average carry-
ing capacity is constant: 〈K(t)〉 = 〈K〉 = (K+ +K−)/2.
The DMNmodels suddenly changing conditions, reflecting
several situations in bacterial life, such as cells living at either
side of a physical phase transition [1], or in the ever-changing
conditions of a host digestive tract. In the laboratory, bac-
teria can be subjected to complex gut-like environment [54]
or simplified stressful conditions, typically through variable
exposure to antibiotics [55–57]. Furthermore, with modern
bioengineering techniques it is possible to perform controled
microbial experiments in settings allowing for sensible com-
parisons with theoretical models sharing some of the features
considered here (switching environment, time-varying popu-
lation size, public good production) [16, 17, 30, 36]. As dis-
cussed in Section IV.B, the setting where colonies of bacteria
are grown in arrays of wells or test tubes [30, 36], modeled as
a metapopulation of communities, is particularly relevant for
our purposes.
In this model, the population evolves according to the mul-
tivariate stochastic process defined by equation (1)-(4), which
obeys the master equation
dP ( ~N, ξ, t)
dt
= (E−S − 1)[T+S P ( ~N, ξ, t)]
+ (E−F − 1)[T+F P ( ~N, ξ, t)]
+ (E+S − 1)[T−S P ( ~N, ξ, t)]]
+ (E+F − 1)[T−F P ( ~N, ξ, t)]
+ ν[P ( ~N,−ξ, t)− P ( ~N, ξ, t)], (5)
where ~N = (NS , NF ), E
±
S/F are shift operators such
that E±SG(NS , NF , ξ, t) = G(NS ± 1, NF , ξ, t) for any
G(NS , NF , ξ, t), and similarly for E
±
F .
Equation (5) fully describes the stochastic eco-evolutionary
dynamics of the population, and can be simulated exactly (see
Sec. SM-II in SM [40]).
Importantly, here demographic fluctuations are coupled to
the colored non-Gaussian environmental noise [39, 40] and
encoded in the master equation (5). This contrasts with the
discrete-time population dynamics of, for example Ref. [18],
where external and internal noises are independent and Gaus-
sian. Simulation results, see figure 1(c) and Ref. [62] (in
whichN(0) = 〈K〉, as in all our simulations), reveal that gen-
erallyN(t) evolves much faster than the population composi-
tion. We considerK+ > K− ≫ 1 to ensure that, after a tran-
sient, N(t) is at quasi-stationarity where it is characterized
by its quasi-stationary distribution (N -QSD). The population
eventually collapses after a time that diverges with the sys-
tem size [51, 52], a phenomenon that can be disregarded for
our purposes. Below we study the eco-evolutionary dynam-
ics in terms of the random variablesN and x, focusing on the
fixation properties of the population and its quasi-stationary
distribution.
It is useful to start our analysis by considering the mean-
field approximation which ignores all noise (say K = 〈K〉).
In this case, the population size N and composition x evolve
deterministically according to [26, 27, 39, 53]
N˙ =
∑
α=S,F
T+α − T−α = N
(
g(x) − N
K
)
, (6)
x˙ =
T+S − T−S
N
− xN˙
N
= −sg(x)x(1 − x)
1− sx , (7)
where the dot signifies the time derivative. Equation (7), rem-
iniscent of a replicator equation [24], predicts that x relaxes
on a timescale t ∼ 1/s ≫ 1 and eventually vanishes while,
according to equation (6),N(t) equilibrates toN(t) = O(K)
in a time t = O(1).
III. PIECEWISE-DETERMINISTICMARKOV PROCESS,
MORANMODEL & FIXATION PROBABILITIES
In this section, we review the effects of environmental and
demographic noise separately, and compound them to find the
fixation probabilities that characterize the population compo-
sition. Here, these results provide the necessary background
for the discussion in Sections IV and V of our main novel
findings.
A. Environmental noise & Piecewise-deterministic Markov
process
If the population is only subject to external noise (EN), it
follows the bivariate piecewise-deterministic Markov process
(PDMP) [58], defined by (7) and
N˙ = N
{
g(x)− NK + ξN
(
1
K −
1
K+
)}
, (8)
where K = 2K+K−/(K+ + K−) is the harmonic mean of
K+ and K− [39]. Equation (8) is a stochastic differential
equation with multiplicative DMN ξ of amplitude N2(K+ −
K−)/(2K+K−) [40]; it reduces to the deterministic limit (6)
when the EN is removed (i.e. K+ = K−).
Although the process is only subject to EN, the global
growth rate g(x) couples the evolutionary and ecological dy-
namics. To simplify the analysis, we introduce an effective
parameter q ≥ 0 (see Section III C 2) and assume a constant
g ≡ 1 + q [39], obtaining the single-variate effective process
N˙ = F(N, ξ) =
{
F+(N) if ξ = 1
F−(N) if ξ = −1,
(9)
with F±(N) ≡ N
[
1 + q − N
K±
]
, (10)
describing the evolution of a population of size N(t) subject
only to EN. According to (9) and (10), each environmental
state ξ has a fixed point
N∗(ξ) =
{
N∗+ = (1 + q)K+ if ξ = 1
N∗− = (1 + q)K− if ξ = −1,
(11)
4After t = O(1), the PDMP is at stationarity, characterized
by a stationary probability density function (PDF) p∗ν,q(N, ξ)
(derived in Section SM-III [40]). Central for our purposes
are the features of the marginal stationary PDF p∗ν,q(N) =
p∗ν,q(N, ξ)+ p
∗
ν,q(N,−ξ), giving the probability density ofN
regardless of the environmental state ξ:
p∗ν,q(N) =
Zν,q
N2
[
(N∗+ −N)(N −N∗−)
N2
] ν
1+q−1
, (12)
with normalization constant Zν,q . Depending on the sign of
the exponent, the distribution may be unimodal or bimodal
[39], but has always support [N∗−, N
∗
+], on which F+ ≥ 0 and
F− ≤ 0.
B. Internal noise & Fitness-dependent Moran process
Internal noise stems from the inherent stochasticity of indi-
vidual birth and death events in the population; it ultimately
causes fixation (one strain taking over the whole population),
and hence determines the long-term population composition.
When internal and ecological dynamics are coupled, which
strain fixates has consequences on the population size, mak-
ing the fixation phenomenon particularly important.
If internal noise is the only source of randomness (constant
K), we can study its effects using the fitness-dependentMoran
model [22, 23, 41, 59, 60], with constant sizeN ≡ K [61]. To
keep the population size constant, at each birth corresponds a
death. Therefore, x increases by 1/N if an S individual is
born and an F dies (SF → SS at rate T˜+S = T+S T−F /N ), and
decreases by 1/N if an F individual is born, replacing a dead
S (SF → FF at rate T˜−S = T−S T+F /N ), with
T˜+S =
1− s
1− sxg(x)(1 − x)xN, T˜
−
S =
1
1− sxg(x)(1 − x)xN .
The corresponding mean-field equation is again (7). For an
initial fraction x0 of S individuals, in the framework of the
Fokker-Planck equation, the fixation probability of S is [22,
23, 41, 68] (see also Section SM-V.A [40])
φ(x0)|N = e
−Ns(1−x0) − e−Ns
1− e−Ns . (13)
The fixation probability of S thus becomes exponentially
smaller the larger the population’s (constant) size or selection
intensity s are; and, notably, is independent of g(x). In the
following we assume x0 = 1/2 and drop the initial condition
for notational simplicity: φ|N ≡ φ(x0)|N and φ ≡ φ(x0).
Clearly, the fixation probability of F is φ˜|N = 1 − φ|N .
In Section SM-V.A [40], we also outline the main proper-
ties of the mean fixation times of the fitness-dependent Moran
model. The most relevant for our purposes is the fact that, in
both cases b = 0 and b > 0, the unconditional and conditional
mean fixation times scale as O(1/s) to leading order when
s≪ 1 and Ns≫ 1.
C. Fixation under switching carrying capacity
The strain S unavoidably goes extinct in the determinis-
tic limit, see equation (7), and has an exponentially vanishing
survival probability when K is constant, see equation (S13).
However, when the carrying capacity switches, the population
undergoes “bottlenecks” that can enhance this probability [39]
and alter the long-term average population size.
1. Fixation probabilities in the pure competition scenario (b = 0)
When b = 0, both species compete for the same finite re-
sources, with a slight selective advantage to F . Therefore,N
and x are solely coupled by demographic fluctuations. After
a time t = O(1), N attains quasi-stationarity where it is dis-
tributed according to its N -QSD [62], that is well described
by the PDF of equation (S3) with q = 0. On the other hand,
x relaxes on a much slower timescale t ∼ 1/s ≫ 1 and we
showed that the mean fixation time scales as O(1/s) to lead-
ing order when s≪ 1 and 〈K〉s≫ 1 [39, 40, 53]. As a conse-
quence, as shown in Section SM-V.B [40], the population ex-
periences, on average, O(ν/s) environmental switches prior
to fixation (see figures S6 [40] and 1(c)). When 0 < s ≪ 1
and K− ≫ 1, we can thus exploit this timescale separation
and compute the S fixation probability φ by averaging φ|N
over the PDF p∗ν/s ≡ p∗ν/s,0, with the rescaled switching rate
ν → ν/s [39]:
φ ≃
∫ K+
K−
φ|N p∗ν/s(N) dN. (14)
The PDF p∗ν/s is sharply peaked at N ≃ K when ν ≫ s,
whereas it has two sharp peaks at N ≃ K± when ν ≪ s.
Equation (14) captures the limiting behavior φ
ν→∞−−−−→ φ|K
when ν ≫ s (many switches prior to fixation), resulting from
the self-average of the EN (since ξ(t)
ν→∞−−−−→ 〈ξ(t)〉 = 0), as
well as φ
ν→0−−−→ (φ|K−+φ|K+)/2 in the regime of rare switch-
ing (ν ≪ s), when the environment almost never changes
prior to fixation [39]. As shown in figure 2 and detailed in
Section SM-IV [40], equation (14) reproduces the simulation
results for the fixation probability of S within a few percent
over a broad range of ν values. While S remains less likely to
fixate than F , its fixation probability is much higher than in a
constant environment (φ≫ φ|〈K〉): environmental variability
considerably offsets the evolutionary bias favoring F .
2. Fixation in the public good scenario, b > 0
In the public good scenario, g(x) = 1 + bx with 0 < b =
O(1), S individuals act as public good producers (coopera-
tors). The higher x, in fact, the higher the reproduction rate of
both strains, see equations (2). However, since S bears alone
the metabolic cost of cooperation (PG production), it grows
slower than F and, deterministically, x decreases.
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FIG. 2: (a) φ vs. ν in the case b = 0: for s = 0.02 (, cyan)
and s = 0.05 (◦, red). (b) q(b) vs. b for s = 0.02 (cyan) and
s = 0.05 (yellow), see text. (c) φ vs. ν in the case b > 0: for
(s, b) = (0.02, 0.2) (blue, ◦), (0.02, 2) (green, ), (0.05, 0.2) (or-
ange, ⋄), (0.05, 2) (red, ∇). Symbols are φ from simulations (104
runs) and solid lines show φq from equation (15). In all panels, other
parameters are (K+,K−, x0) = (450, 50, 0.5).
When b > 0, N and x are explicitly coupled, and they
do not evolve on separate timescales: N is a fast variable,
enslaved to the slow-varying x [62]. To determine the fixation
probability, in Ref. [39] we devised an effective approach,
based on suitably choosing the parameter q (0 ≤ q ≤ b) and
setting g(x) ≡ 1 + q in equation (8). This decouples N and
x in an effective population whose size distribution, at quasi-
stationarity and for any ν, is well described by the PDF (S3).
Within this effective theory approach, the fixation probability
of S is thus determined similarly to the case b = 0:
φq =
∫ N∗+
N∗
−
φ|N p∗ν/s,q(N) dN . (15)
As above, As above, this expression simplifies in the limiting
regimes of frequent/rare switching: φq ≃ φ(∞)q ≡ φ|(1+q)K
when ν ≫ s, and φq ≃ φ(0)q ≡ (φ|N∗
−
+ φ|N∗
+
)/2 when
ν ≪ s. We determined the effective parameter q = q(b) for
given (K±, s, b) by matching the prediction of φ
(∞)
q with the
results of simulations (see [39] and SM [40]). Figure 2(b)
shows that q(b) increases almost linearly with b, and depends
weakly on s. Clearly, q(0) = 0when b = 0, and equation (15)
thus reverts to (14).
Figure 2(c) shows that the effective approach captures the
effects of the coupling between N and x for several choices
of b and s, over a broad range of ν. As detailed in SM-IV,
the predictions of equation (15) agree within a few percent
with simulation results when s ≪ 1, while the accuracy de-
teriorates as s and b increase, therefore lowering φ. In fact,
increasing b yields higher q(b), which results in effectively
increasing the carrying capacity K± → (1 + q(b))K±. In
the ν → ∞, 0 limits, this is equivalent to rescaling the selec-
tion intensity as s → (1 + q(b))s, as inferred from φ(∞,0)q
and equation (S13). Therefore φ decays (approximately) ex-
ponentially with b, as shown by figure 3(a).
IV. CORRELATIONS & COOPERATION IN THE
ECO-EVOLUTIONARY GAME
After a time t≫ 1/s, fixation has very likely occurred and
the population composition is fixed and consists of only F or
S individuals. In this quasi-stationary regime, the population
size N(t) however keeps fluctuating, driven by the randomly
switching carrying capacityK(t).
When the slow strain S produces a public good (PG), the
long-time eco-evolutionary dynamics is characterized by cor-
relations between the population size and its composition. In
this section, we analyze these long-term effects by character-
izing the correlations first, and then by analyzing the ensuing
“eco-evolutionary game”.
To this end, it is useful to consider the average population
size 〈N〉∗ν,b for given ν and b, after a time t ≫ 1/s, when the
population is at quasi-stationarity and consists of only S or
F individuals, see Section SM-V.B [40]. Within the PDMP
approximation—that is, approximating the evolution of N by
the PDMP (9), see Section SM-VI.A [40]—we can compute
the quasi-stationary average ofN using p∗ν,q given by eq. (S3)
(see also Sec. VA):
〈N〉∗ν,b = (1 + b)φb〈N〉∗ ν
1+b ,0
+ φ˜b〈N〉∗ν,0 > 〈N〉∗ν,0, (16)
where 〈N〉∗ν,0 is the population long-time average in the ab-
sence of PG production, φb denotes the fixation probability of
S for a public good parameter b, and φ˜b = 1 − φb. Through
equation (16), the PDMP approximation thus predicts that the
long-term population size increases with b, see figure 3(b).
Furthermore, while the fixation probabilities φb and φ˜b can in-
crease or decrease with ν, the PDMP approximation predicts
that the average population size at stationarity monotonically
decreases with ν (see (S20)-(S22) in SM-VI.A [40]). Simula-
tion results shown in figure 3(b) confirm that 〈N〉∗ν,b increases
with b, and decreases with ν (keeping other parameters con-
stant).
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FIG. 3: (a) φ vs b in lin-log scale for s = 0.02, ν = 0.1 (or-
ange, ◦) and ν = 10 (cyan, ∇); s = 0.05, ν = 10 (yellow, ).
Lines are from (15) and markers are from simulations. (b) 〈N〉∗ν,b
vs. ν for b = 0 (cyan, squares), b = 0.2 (blue, circles) and b = 2
(green, triangles) and s = 0.02. Solid lines are from (16); empty
symbols are from simulations; filled symbols are from (27) within
the linear noise approximation. Dashed lines indicate the predictions
of (16) in the regimes ν →∞, 0, see SM-VI.A [40]. Parameters are
(K+,K−, x0) = (450, 50, 0.5).
A. Correlations between ecological & evolutionary dynamics
Equation (16) also highlights how fixation probabilities af-
fect the long-term average population size. When b > 0, there
are nontrivial correlations between population size and com-
position, and how N(t) and x(t) are correlated is of direct
biological relevance, see e.g. [30, 31]. Prior to fixation, these
correlations are accounted by the effective parameter q(b) (see
section III C 2). Here, we investigate their effect after fixation
using the rescaled connected correlation function
Cν,b(t) = 〈(N(t)− 〈N(t)〉) (x(t) − 〈x(t)〉)〉〈N(t)〉〈x(t)〉 , (17)
where 〈·〉 denotes the ensemble average. When 〈N(t)x(t)〉 =
〈N(t)〉〈x(t)〉, i.e. in absence of correlations, Cν,b(t) van-
ishes. At quasi-stationary, t ≫ 1/s, we have 〈N(t)x(t)〉 →
〈Nx〉∗ν,b, 〈N(t)〉 → 〈N〉∗ν,b, x→ 1 or 0 with respective prob-
ability φb and φ˜b, 〈x(t)〉 → φb and Cν,b(t)→ C∗ν,b. Within the
PDMP approximation, using eq. (16) and φb ≃ φq , equation
(17) becomes (t≫ 1/s)
C∗ν,b =
〈Nx〉∗ν,b
〈N〉∗ν,bφb
− 1 ≃
φ˜q
[
(1 + b)〈N〉∗ ν
1+b ,0
− 〈N〉∗ν,0
]
(1 + b)φq〈N〉∗ ν
1+b ,0
+ φ˜q〈N〉∗ν,0
. (18)
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FIG. 4: (a) C∗ν,b vs b for s = 0.05 and ν ≃ 1 (cyan, ⋄), ν = 0.1
(yellow, ∇); s = 0.02 and ν = 1 (red, ), and ν = 0.1 (orange,
◦). (b) C∗ν,b vs ν for b = 2 and s = 0.05 (red, ∇), s = 0.02 (green,
△); b = 0.2 and s = 0.05 (orange, ⋄), s = 0.02 (blue, ◦). In all
panels, the parameters are (K+,K−, x0) = (450, 50, 0.5). Symbols
are results from simulations and solid lines are from equation (18);
dashed lines in panel (b) denote the analytical predictions of Cν,b in
the limits ν ≪ s and ν ≫ 1, see text.
Since 〈N〉∗ν,0 is decreasing in ν (see figure 3(a)), this long-
term correlation is always positive for b ≥ 0, and vanishes
only for b = 0.
As shown in figure 4, C∗ν,b grows approximately linearly
with b and is non-monotonic in ν with a maximum for ν =
O(1); all features that equation (18) captures well. The ν-
dependence of C∗ν,b stems from the fact that φb increases or
decreases with ν, depending on the value of s, see figure 2(c)
[39]. In the limiting regimes ν → ∞, 0, equation (18) sim-
plifies and yields C∗ν,b ≃ b[1 − (1 + b)φ(∞,0)q(b) ] [40]. There-
fore, in these the limiting regimes C∗ν,b increases in s, and
scales as O(b), as shown by figure 4, yielding 〈Nx〉∗ =
(1 +O(b))〈N〉∗ν,bφ(∞,0)q(b) .
These results show that, when species S provides a PG,
there are nontrivial long-term correlations between ecological
and evolutionary variables: the population size is shaped by
its composition. The correlations between N and x are max-
imal in the intermediate switching regime where ν = O(1)
is comparable to the growth rate of N , and are weaker in the
limiting switching regimes, on which we devised the effective
theory of section IIIC 2.
7B. When is cooperation beneficial? In which conditions is it
best to cooperate?
Producing the public good (PG) slows the growth of the
S strain, see equation (7) with g(x) > 0, and thus reduces
exponentially the fixation probability of S, as shown in fig-
ure 3(a). On the other hand, the PG leads to higher aver-
age population sizes (see equation (16) and figure 3(b)) and
therefore provides a long-term benefit to the whole popula-
tion. At the population level, a “social dilemma” [24, 41] of
sorts arises after fixation of either F or S: Cooperators pay
a cost through their reduced fixation probability, while they
provide a benefit, through the PG, by increasing the expected
long-term number of individuals of both strains. We analyze
the trade-off between benefit and cost of cooperation by intro-
ducing the notion of “eco-evolutionary game” in the context of
a metapopulation of non-interacting communities: Each sys-
tem realization (simulation run) corresponds to a community
of time-fluctuating size, and the collection of the system’s re-
alizations constitutes the metapopulation [26, 27, 30, 37], that
is an ensemble of non-interacting communities. After fixa-
tion, each community consists of only S or F individuals. It is
worth emphasizing that the social dilemma arising in the eco-
evolutionary game differs from traditional games in a finite
population of constant size [24, 41]: Although F is always
more likely to fixate than S (when x0 is not too close to 1, as in
classical evolutionary games), communities consisting only of
individuals of strain S can be of significantly larger size than
those containing onlyF ’s thanks to their production of PG (al-
lowing them to possibly attain the maximum carrying capacity
(1 + b)K+). In this eco-evolutionary game in a population of
time-varying size, we thus propose to measure the evolution-
ary success of a strain in terms of the population size averaged
after fixation over the ensemble of non-interacting communi-
ties, see also Section SM-VI.B of the SM [40]: The expected
payoff of the game is hence the relative long-term average
number of individuals of each strain, see below. Interestingly,
this formulation of the eco-evolutionary game is of potential
direct relevance to microbial experiments in which colonies
of bacteria, some of which can produce a public good, are
grown and compete in “a metapopulation of test tubes”, see
e.g. [30, 31, 36, 37].
Below, we use the PDMP approximation and simulations
to investigate the relative abundance of each species at quasi-
stationarity (see also Section SM-VI.A [40]).
The average number of F individuals at quasi-stationarity,
given a switching rate ν and PG parameter b is
〈NF 〉∗ν,b = 〈N |x = 0〉∗ν,b = (1 − φb)〈N〉∗ν,0,
i.e. the average population size conditioned to F fixation.
Similarly, the average number of cooperators S at quasi-
stationarity is
〈NS〉∗ν,b = 〈N |x = 1〉∗ν,b = (1 + b)φb〈N〉∗ν/(1+b),0.
In the context of the above eco-evolutionary game, we pro-
pose to measure the expected payoff provided by the PG as
the difference between the expected number of individuals of
a strain at quasi-stationarity when b > 0 relative to the case
b = 0. Hence, the expected payoff to F is
∆Fν,b ≡ 〈NF 〉∗ν,b − 〈NF 〉∗ν,0 = (φ0 − φb)〈N〉∗ν,0 > 0. (19)
Since φ0 > φb, see figure 3(b), this quantity is positive and in-
creases with b. This means that, as in other social dilemmas,
see, e.g., Ref. [24, 41], the benefit of “freeriding” increases
when the level of cooperation, here given by b, is raised. How-
ever, this does not rule out the possibility that, under certain
circumstances, the PG production can be either beneficial or
detrimental to S, and even permits S to be better off than F .
In fact, the (global) eco-evolutionary expected payoff for co-
operators reads
∆Sν,b ≡ 〈NS〉∗ν,b − 〈NS〉∗ν,0
= (1 + b)φb〈N〉∗ν
1+b ,0
− φ0〈N〉∗ν,0, (20)
and clearly varies nontrivially with ν and b. Unless ∆Sν,b >
0, the PG is actually detrimental for cooperators: the expected
number of S individuals is lower than it would be without PG.
In this context, the PG benefits cooperators only if the increase
in the average population size offsets the decrease in fixation
probability, i.e. if
∆Sν,b > 0⇔ (1 + b)
〈N〉∗ ν
1+b ,0
〈N〉∗ν,0
>
φ0
φb
In figure 5, we show that∆Sν,b is non-monotonic in b, gener-
ating a maximum at an optimal value b∗(ν, s), which defines
the conditions where PG production is the most rewarding for
cooperators. Moreover, we observe a definite critical thresh-
old bc(ν, s), belowwhich producing a PG benefits cooperators
since∆Sν,b > 0.
Using our effective theory, φ ≃ φq(b), and the PDMP ap-
proximation, the expected payoff of S (S24) reads
∆Sν,b = (1 + b)φq(b)
∫ K+
K−
Np∗ν
1+b
(N) dN
− φ0
∫ K+
K−
Np∗ν(N) dN . (21)
When ν → ∞, the DMN self-averages (ξ → 〈ξ〉 = 0) and
equation (S24) is given by the expected payoff of S in a popu-
lation of effective size 〈N〉∗∞,0 = K, see equation (S23) [40],
yielding ∆S∞,b = [(1 + b)φ
(∞)
q(b) − φ
(∞)
0 ]K. Hence, when
the DMN self-averages, the expected payoff of S is positive if
φ
(∞)
q(b) > φ
(∞)
0 /(1 + b).
Results in figure 5 show that equation (21) approximates
well the simulation results over a broad range of parameters.
The root and the maximum of equation (21) provide (approx-
imate) predictions for bc and b
∗, see figures 6 and S7(a) [40].
These figures reveal that bc and b
∗ depend non-monotonically
on ν and vary greatly with s, both behaviors well-captured by
the theory. Figures 5 and S7(b) [40] also show that the max-
imal payoff for S can be significantly higher than that of F ,
especially when the selection s is low.
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FIG. 5: (a) ∆Sν,b vs. b for s = 0.02 and switching rates ν = 10
(cyan, ∇), ν = 1 (red, ), ν = 0.1 (orange, ◦). Predictions from
equation (21) (solid) are compared to simulation results (symbols).
The grey dashed line corresponds to the predictions of ∆S∞,b, see
text. We find ∆Sν,b > 0 when 0 < b < bc(ν, s) with an optimal
payoff for S when b = b∗(ν, s), e.g. (bc, b
∗) ≈ (4.9, 2.1) at ν = 1.
(b) ∆Sb,ν vs. b with ν ≃ 0.44, for s = 0.02 (blue, ∇), s = 0.03
(red, ⋄), and s = 0.05 (green, ◦). Solid lines are from equation (21)
and symbols are simulation results (see SM [40]). (c) Expected pay-
offs ∆Sν,b and ∆Fν,b vs. b for s = 0.02 obtained from equation
(21). Dashed lines show the values of b∗, β and bc. In all panels, the
parameters are (K+,K−, x0) = (450, 50, 0.5).
In order to discuss the properties of the eco-evolutionary
game, it is useful to determine the value b = β(ν, s) of equal
expected payoff, i.e. such that which ∆Sν,β = ∆Fν,β , see
figure 5(c). From equations (S25)-(21), we find that β(ν, s) is
the solution of
1
1 + β
(
2φ0
φq(β)
− 1
)
=
〈N〉∗ ν
1+β ,0
〈N〉∗ν,0
=
∫K+
K−
Np∗ ν
1+β
dN∫ K+
K−
Np∗ν dN
. (22)
So β is a nontrivial function of ν and s, see figure 6(b).
Given the parameters b and s of the eco-evolutionary game,
we have studied the values of the switching rate ν for which
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FIG. 6: (a) bc vs ν. Symbols are results from simulations and solid
lines are from equation (21) for s = 0.02 (blue), s = 0.03 (orange),
and s = 0.05 (green). (b) Heatmap of (∆Sν,b − ∆Fν,b)/〈N〉
∗
ν,0,
from equation (21) for s = 0.02. The gray dotted line shows b =
bc(ν, s), the dashed line b = β(ν, s) and the solid line b = b
∗(ν, s).
In the blue area (phases (i) and (ii)), b > β and F is better off than
S (∆Fν,b > ∆Sν,b). PG production is detrimental for S in phase
(i) where b > bc and ∆Sν,b < 0; beneficial for S (∆Sν,b > 0)
in phase (ii) where β < b < bc, but more beneficial for F (higher
expected payoff). In the red/pink area of region (iii), b < β and
S is better off than F (∆Sν,b > ∆Fν,b), see text. Colored dots
correspond to “gaps” in the numerical data (see [40]). Parameters
are (K+,K−, x0) = (450, 50, 0.5).
it is beneficial to cooperate by producing a public good, and
determined three distinct phases represented in the diagram of
figure 6(b):
(i) When b > bc, the PG production is detrimental for S.
The cost of cooperation outweighs its benefits and the
expected payoff for S is negative (∆Sν,b < 0). The PG
thus benefits only F .
(ii) When β < b < bc, the PG production benefits S, but
benefits F more (0 < ∆Sν,b < ∆Fν,b).
9(iii) When 0 < b < β, S reaps a higher expected payoff than
F (∆Sν,b > ∆Fν,b > 0). In this case, the benefit of the
PG outweigh its cost, and its production is favored.
Within the above metapopulation interpretation of the eco-
evolutionary game, species F effectively exploits S in phases
(i) and (ii), but is at a disadvantage in phase (iii). Since the
expected payoff to S is positive in regions (ii) and (iii), we say
that cooperation of a public good with benefit parameter b is
beneficial when 0 < b < bc(ν, s), and advantageous for 0 <
b < β(ν, s). Given a set of parameters (b, ν, s), PG production
is the best strategy if two conditions are met: (a) the expected
payoff of S is higher than that of F , which is satisfied in phase
(iii); (b) b yields the maximum possible payoff for S, i.e., b =
b∗. Hence, in an environment switching at rate ν and under
a selection intensity s, the best conditions to cooperate for
the public good production is when the PG benefit parameter
satisfies b = b∗(ν, s) < β(ν, s), represented by the solid gray
line in phase (iii) of figure 6(b). It is also worth noting that this
discussion also holds when the time-varying population size
is not driven by the environmental noise: The limiting case
ν →∞, for which the DMN self-averages and the population
reaches an effective size N → K, corresponds to the right
end of the diagram of figure 6(b) where ν ≫ 1. Remarkably,
environmental stochasticity yields several additional regimes
in which cooperating becomes beneficial.
In the above context of a well-mixed population whose size
fluctuates in time, this eco-evolutionary game shows that there
are conditions under which PG production is beneficial for co-
operators, and may even be the optimal strategy. This does not
imply that the social dilemma, which still holds in its classi-
cal form prior to fixation, is resolved in general. However,
this demonstrates that under environmental variability there
are conditions in which cooperation (PG production), albeit
disadvantaged in the short term, can be more successful than
freeriding in the long term. In fact, although freeriders have
a constant growth-rate advantage over cooperators and are al-
ways more likely to fixate (assuming x0 = 1/2), here, the
selective bias can be efficiently balanced by environmental
variability, by allowing cooperators to be successful in form-
ing, in the long term, larger communities than freeriders [40].
This can result in a greater increase of the long-term average
number of cooperators than free-riders, and exemplifies the
potential role of a fluctuating environment on the emergence
of cooperative behavior in microbial communities.
V. LINEAR-NOISE AND PDMP APPROXIMATIONS TO
THE POPULATION QSD
After t ≫ 1/s, the population is likely to be at quasi-
stationarity with its composition fixed [39]. Yet, the popu-
lation size still fluctuates and N(t) is distributed according to
its quasi-stationary distribution. When K− ≫ 1, the popula-
tion size is always large and, in the first instance, demographic
fluctuations are negligible compared to environmental noise.
In this case, eq. (9) characterizes reasonably well, albeit not
fully, the long-term properties of N(t).
A. Linear-noise approximation about the PDMP predictions
Throughout this work (and in [39]), we have shown that the
PDMP approximation p∗PDMP,ν,b(N) = φp
∗
ν,b(N) + φ˜p
∗
ν(N)
reproduces many characteristics of the quasi-stationary size
distribution (N -QSD). However, as p∗ν and p
∗
ν,b only account
for the external noise (EN), they cannot reproduce the com-
plete N -QSD, which is also subject to internal noise (IN).
Here, we use the linear noise approximation (LNA) about the
PDMP predictions to account for the joint effect of the two
noise sources, IN and EN, on the N -QSD.
The LNA is widely employed to quantify the effect of weak
demographic fluctuations in the absence of external noise [68,
69], and has recently been used to study the joint effect of
decoupled internal and external noise [12]. Here, we show
how to generalize the LNA to the case where the population
size fluctuates and demographic fluctuations are coupled to
the external noise.
For our analysis, we assume that K+ & K− ≫ 1, so
that 〈K〉 is large and of the same order as K± (see Section
SM-VII [40] for details). It is convenient to work with the
continuous random variable n = N/Ω, where Ω = 〈K〉 ≫ 1
is the system’s “large parameter”. The auxiliary Markovian
process {n(t), ξ(t)} that we consider for the LNA is defined
by n
T +−→ n + Ω−1, n T
−
−→ n − Ω−1 and ξ ν−→ −ξ, where
the transition rates T ± are given by equations (S30) in the SM
[40]. We also introduce ψ = limΩ→∞N/Ω = O(1), which
obeys the stochastic differential equation (S33) [40] defining
the corresponding PDMP, and the random variable η(t), cap-
turing the fluctuations of n about ψ, according to
n(t) = ψ(t) +
η(t)√
Ω
, (23)
We are interested in the (quasi-)stationary joint probabil-
ity density π∗ν,q(η, ψ, ξ) of the process {n(t), ξ(t)}. This
probability density can be decomposed into π∗ν,q(η, ψ, ξ) =
π∗(η|ψ, ξ)π∗ν,q(ψ, ξ), where π∗ν,q(ψ, ξ) = Ωp∗ν,q(Ωψ, ξ) is the
stationary joint PDF of the PDMP {ψ(t)} and is readily ob-
tained from the PDF of the PDMP defined by equation (9).
The stationary probability density π∗(η|ψ, ξ) accounts for the
demographic fluctuations about {ψ(t)} in the environmental
state ξ. Following Ref. [12], we assume that the demographic
fluctuations are approximately the same in both environmental
states, i.e. π∗ν,q(η|ψ, ξ) ≃ π∗ν,q(η|ψ,−ξ), and simply denote
π∗ν,q(η|ψ) ≡ π∗ν,q(η|ψ,±ξ). This assumption is reasonable
whenK+ andK− are of the same order, and yields
π∗ν,q(η, ψ, ξ) ≃ π∗(η|ψ)π∗ν,q(ψ, ξ). (24)
With this approximation, the quasi-stationary marginal LNA
probability density of {n(t)} is
π∗ν,q(n) =
∑
ξ=±1
∫ ∫
dψdη π∗(η|ψ)
× π∗ν,q(ψ, ξ) δ
(
n− ψ − η√
Ω
)
, (25)
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FIG. 7: Histograms of the population size distribution (N -QSD)
when b = 0 (shaded area) compared with the predictions of the LNA
(solid), from equation (S39) of the SM [40], and with the PDMP
predictions (dashed), from p∗ν,0, for different switching rates: (a)
ν = 0.01, (b) ν = 0.1, (c) ν = 1, (d) ν = 10, see text. Param-
eters are (K+,K−, s, x0) = (400, 100, 0.02, 0.5). Here, K = 160.
where π∗(η|ψ) = exp{−η2/(2ψ)}/√2πψ (see SM [40]
for details), and the Dirac delta ensures that (23) is satis-
fied. Calling p∗LNA,ν,0(N) = π
∗
ν,0(n)/Ω and p
∗
LNA,ν,b(N) =
π∗ν,b(n)/Ω, explicitly given by eqs. (S39) and (S40) in SM
[40], the LNA quasi-stationary probability density reads
p∗LNA,ν,b(N) = φp
∗
LNA,ν,b(N) + φ˜p
∗
LNA,ν,0(N). (26)
Within the LNA, the quasi-stationary average population
size is obtained by averagingN over p∗LNA,ν,b(N):
〈N〉∗LNA,ν,b =
∫ ∞
0
Np∗LNA,ν,b(N) dN , (27)
where, it is worth noting, the integral is no longer restricted to
a finite support. As figure 3(b) shows, 〈N〉∗LNA,ν,b is as good
an approximation of simulation results, as its PDMP counter-
part 〈N〉∗ν,b from equation (16). This is not surprising, and as
done in Section IV, it is convenient to compute the averages
of N using the PDMP approximation, i.e. by averaging over
p∗PDMP,ν,b(N) as in eq. (16). However, as elaborated below,
the LNA via the equation (26) gives an excellent characteriza-
tion of the full N -QSD, well beyond the scope of the PDMP
approximation.
B. LNA,N -QSD, and noise-induced transitions
1. Pure resource competition scenario, b = 0
In the pure resource competition scenario (b = 0),
p∗LNA,ν,0(N) = π
∗
0(n)/Ω provides an excellent approxima-
tion of theN -QSD in all switching regimes, as shown in figure
7. In particular, p∗LNA,ν,0 captures the noise-induced transition
arising about ν = 1 [39, 43, 44]: When ν < 1, the switching
FIG. 8: Histograms of the population size distribution (N -QSD)
when b = 2 (shaded area) compared with the predictions of the LNA
(solid), from eq. (26) and equations (S39) and (S40) in the SM [40],
and with the PDMP predictions (dashed) based on eq. (S3), with
q = b (when x = 1) and q = 0 (when x = 0), for different switching
rates: (a) ν = 0.01, (b) ν = 0.1, (c) ν = 1, (d) ν = 10. Parameters
are (K+,K−, s, b, x0) = (400, 100, 0.02, 2, 0.5). For the analytical
results, we have used the expression (15) for φ(b) ≃ φq(b).
rate is lower than the population growth rate, and the N -QSD
and p∗LNA,0 are both bimodal, with peaks at N ≈ K±, see
figure 7 (a,b). When ν > 1, the switching rate exceeds the
population growth rate, and theN -QSD and p∗LNA,ν,0 are thus
unimodal, with a peak at N ≈ K, see Figure 7(c,d).
Figure 7 also shows that p∗LNA,ν,0(N) accurately predicts
the peaks, their width and intensity, and the skewness of the
N -QSD, whereas the PDMP predictions from equation (S3)
only captures the position of the peaks. This demonstrates
how demographic fluctuations, aptly accounted for by the
LNA, cause the discrepancies between the N -QSD and p∗ν .
2. Public-good scenario, b > 0
The LNA expression (26) also provides an excellent ap-
proximation of the N -QSD in all switching regimes for the
public good scenario (b > 0), see figure 8. In particular,
p∗LNA,ν,b captures the noise-induced transitions arising about
ν = 1 and ν = 1+b [39]: When ν < 1, both conditional pop-
ulation distributions (for fixations to S or F ) are bimodal, with
different peaks. N -QSD and p∗LNA,ν,b thus have four peaks at
N ≈ K± and N ≈ (1 + b)K±, see figure 8(a,b). When
1 < ν < 1 + b, the S-conditional distribution is bimodal,
whereas the F -conditional distribution is unimodal. The N -
QSD and p∗LNA,ν,b thus have three peaks at N ≈ (1 + b)K±
and N ≈ K, see figure 8(c). Finally, when ν > 1 + b,
both conditional distributions are unimodal, but with differ-
ent peaks. Hence, the N -QSD and p∗LNA,ν,b are bimodal with
peaks atN ≈ K and N ≈ (1 + b)K, see figure 8(d)
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As figure 8 shows, p∗LNA,ν,b(N) provides a faithful charac-
terization of the N -QSD also when b > 0. This reiterates that
the discrepancies with the PDMP approximation stem from
demographic fluctuations. We also notice that the accuracy of
the LNA slightly deteriorates near the lower-intensity peaks
at high N and low ν (see figure 8(a)). These correspond to
rare events, usually beyond the scope of the LNA. Moreover,
in those regimes, some assumptions made in the derivation—
e.g. equation (24)— reach the limit of their validity, see SM
[40].
VI. CONCLUSION
We have studied the eco-evolutionary dynamics of a pop-
ulation subject to a randomly switching carrying capacity in
which one strain has a slight selective advantage over an-
other. In a model inspired by microbial communities evolv-
ing in fluctuating environments, we have considered two
scenarios—one of pure resource competition (no interaction
between strains) and one in which the slow (cooperating)
strain produces a public good—and investigated the coupled
effect of demographic and environmental noise.
The population composition has been characterized by the
fixation probabilities, computed using the analytical proce-
dure devised in Ref. [39], and, when a public good is pro-
duced, shown to be non-trivially correlated with the evolution
of the population size. As a result, the production of public
good gives rise to an eco-evolutionary game: On the one hand,
producing the public good lowers the survival/fixation proba-
bility of cooperators; on the other hand, it also increases their
population size. A social dilemma of sorts therefore ensues
and, in a fluctuating environment, it is a priori not intuitively
clear whether there are circumstances under which it is bene-
ficial to produce a public good and what these conditions may
be. Since we consider the eco-evolutionary game in a popula-
tion of fixed composition (after fixation) but whose size fluc-
tuates, we have proposed to measure the evolutionary benefit
of the public good in terms of the long-term expected number
of individuals of each strain. This is done in the biologically-
inspired setting of a metapopulation of non-interacting com-
munities of varying size composed uniquely by one of the
species. In certain circumstances, that we have determined,
the public good production allows the communities composed
of cooperatingS individuals to achieve a greater long-term in-
crease of their average size than the communities consisting of
freeriding F individuals. In these conditions, we say that the
cooperating strain outcompetes the freeriding one. We have
thus determined, both analytically and with simulations, the
circumstances under which cooperation is beneficial or detri-
mental to public good producers, as well as the conditions un-
der which it is the optimal strategy. Hence, we have demon-
strated that the rate of switching, along with the selection in-
tensity and the public good parameter, determine when one
species is more successful than another. Our analysis of the
“eco-evolutionary game” thus shows that in a fluctuating pop-
ulation the evolutionary success of a strain goes beyond hav-
ing a growth-rate advantage and a higher fixation probability.
We have also advanced the characterization of the popula-
tion size distribution by generalizing the linear noise approxi-
mation to populations of fluctuating size, thus accounting for
demographic fluctuations about the predictions of the under-
lying piecewise deterministic Markov process. While we have
found that the linear noise and the piecewise-deterministic
Markov process approximations describe the average popu-
lation size equally well, only the former fully characterizes
the population size distribution. In fact, the linear noise ap-
proach accounts for the joint effect of environmental and de-
mographic noise and has allowed us to capture the width and
skewness of the population size distribution.
This study shows that coupled environmental and demo-
graphic noise can greatly influence how the composition and
size of a population evolve. In particular, social interactions
between strains—such as public good production—can lead
to intricate eco-evolutionary dynamics, which potentially
support cooperation. This sheds light on phenomena that
are directly relevant to microbial communities, which often
feature coupled internal and ecological evolution. This can
yield the kind of eco-evolutionary game analyzed here, that
can be a potential theoretical framework for experimental
studies investigating the emergence of cooperative behavior
in microbial communities of time-fluctuating size.
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Appendix: Supplementary Material for
Eco-Evolutionary Dynamics of a Population with Randomly Switching Carrying
Capacity
In this SupplementaryMaterial, we provide comments concerning the dichotomous noise, notes on the methodology and data
avalability, the derivation of the probability densities of the piecewise-deterministic Markov process (PDMP), complementary
results about the mean fixation times, as well as additional discussions about the PDMP approximation and the emergence of
cooperation in the eco-evolutionary game, and additional technical details concerning the linear noise approximation to the
population size’s quasi-stationary distribution.
In what follows, unless stated otherwise, the notation is the same as in the main text and the equations and figures refer to
those therein. (As in the main text, unless explicitly mentioned otherwise, below we tacitly assume x0 = 1/2.)
SM-I. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DICHOTOMOUSMARKOV NOISE AND OTHER FORMS OF ENVIRONMENTAL
NOISE
It is worth outlining some of the similarities and differences between the dichotomousMarkov Noise (DMN) and the Ornstein-
Uhlenbeck process (OUP) that is also commonly used to model environmental noise, see e.g. [9]. Both are colored noises with
exponential auto-correlation functions, see Sec. II in the main text and Refs. [43, 44]. However, while the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck
Process is a Gaussian and unbounded process, the DMN is, in general, neither. In fact, the piecewise-deterministic Markov
process (PDMP) [58]
N˙ = N
(
1 + q − NK
)
+∆ξ, (S1)
with the DMN ξ, becomes a diffusive process with Gaussian white noise and diffusion constant D = ∆2/ν only in the limit of
∆→∞, ν →∞ and 0 < D <∞, see, e.g., Refs. [43, 44, 47]. The PDMP that we consider in this work has the form:
N˙ = F(N, ξ) =
{
F+(N) if ξ = 1
F−(N) if ξ = −1
with F±(N) ≡ N
[
1 + q − N
K±
]
, (S2)
which coincides with equations (9) of the main text and (S1) with ∆ = (K+ − K−)/(2K+K−). Since K+ > K− ≫ 1, the
Gaussian white noise limit is unphysical, and the PDMP that we consider in this work is therefore never diffusive.
It is also worth noting that, being bounded, the DMN has the great advantage of guaranteeing that the fluctuating carrying
capacity K(t) = [(K+ + K−) + ξ(t)(K+ − K−)]/2 remains always finite and positive, which would not be the case if ξ(t)
was given by an OUP. Furthermore, the DMN can be considered a discrete-step approximation [43, 44] of the OUP, but is more
mathematically tractable and easier to simulate.
SM-II. NOTES ONMETHODOLOGY & DATA AVAILABILITY
Source code for all simulations, resulting data and the Mathematica notebook [63] used for calculations and figures are
available electronically [40].
A. Stochastic simulations
Using Gillespie’s stochastic simulation algorithm (SSA) [64], we have simulated exactly the dynamics described by the
master equation (5). To efficiently ensure that quasi-stationarity was reached [52], we have run individual-based simulations
until fixation occurred in 99% of the realizations (for ν & s), or until time reaches t = 10/ν (when ν ≪ s). We have simulated
ensembles of 104 realizations of the system, except to determine the various population size distributions (for which we used a
larger sample of 105 realizations) and when using “high values” of s (i.e. for s = O(1) as in figure S2). In this case, an even
larger sample of 106 realizations was needed to accurately estimate the fixation probability of S.
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B. Numerical limitations on effective parameter q(b) approach
To obtain the parameter q(b) used in the formula (15) for φq , we first recorded the fixation probability from SSA results with
constantK = K, b ∈ {0.1k : k ∈ N, k ≤ 100}, and s ∈ {0.02, 0.05} (106 runs each). For each combination of parameters, we
computed q(b) by matching the fixation probability φ|(1+q)K of the fitness-dependent Moran model, see equation (S13), with
the corresponding fixation probability obtained in the SSA result.
The values of q(b) have then been used to compute φq according to equation (15) for several values of ν, as shown in figure
3(b). Due to numerical instabilities in the evaluation of stationary distribution p∗ν,q in Mathematica [63], numerical evaluations
of φq occasionally “failed” or produced outliers. Data corresponding to these occasional issues were omitted (without statistical
consequences) from our dataset. This has sometimes led to some gaps in the lines of the analytical predictions (see e.g. the
green curve in figure 3 (b)). Furthermore, q(b) has only been determined for a discrete set of b values, which limits the resolution
in determining bc and b
∗. Specifically, since the spacing between the values used for b was 0.1, neither b∗ nor bc has been
determined with an accuracy higher than 0.1. The combination of limited resolution and outliers causes the jaggedness observed
in figure S7(a) for the graph of b∗ obtained by looking for the maximum of equation (21).
C. Data availability: Mathematica notebook & Linear noise approximation figures 7 and 8
The direct numerical evaluation of equations (S39) and (S40), used to generate the figures 7 and 8, is commented in the
accompanying Mathematica notebook [40].
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FIG. S1: Histograms of population size (N -QSD) and from the joint PDMP PDF (S8) when b = 0, for (a) ν = 0.01, (b) ν = 0.1, (c) ν = 1,
and (d) ν = 10. Shaded areas correspond to SSA results for ξ = +1 (purple) and ξ = −1 (cyan); dashed and dotted lines are from (S8) with
ξ = +1 and ξ = −1, respectively. Parameters are (K+,K−, s, x0, b) = (400, 100, 0.02, 0.5, 0)
SM-III. JOINT AND MARGINAL STATIONARY PDFS OF THE AUXILIARY PDMP (9)
In the main text, we have frequently used of the marginal stationary probability density function (PDF) of the single-variate
PDMP (9) that reads
p∗ν,q(N) =
Zν,q
N2
[
(N∗+ −N)(N −N∗−)
N2
] ν
1+q−1
, (S3)
and is given by equation (12) in the main text. When b = q = 0, we have p∗ν,0(N) ≡ p∗ν(N) = ZνN2
[
(K+−N)(N−K−)
N2
]ν−1
.
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In this section, we outline the derivation of this PDF, as well as that of the joint stationary probability density p∗ν,q(N, ξ) of
N and ξ. For notational simplicity, in the remainder of this section, we write pν,q = p and p
∗
ν,q = p
∗. It follows from the
Chapman-Kolmogorov equation, that p(N, ξ) obeys the master-like equation [43]
∂tp(N, ξ, t) = −∂N [F(N, ξ)p(N, ξ, t)]− ν [p(N, ξ, t)− p(N,−ξ, t)] , (S4)
which can conveniently be rewritten as ∂tp(N, ξ, t) = −∂NJ(N, ξ, t) in terms of the probability current [12]
J(N, ξ, t) = F(N, ξ)p(N, ξ, t) + ν
∫ N
N∗
−
dN ′ [p(N ′, ξ, t)− p(N ′,−ξ, t)] . (S5)
The first term on the right-hand-side (RHS) of (S5) accounts for the probability flowing outside [N∗−, N ] (Liouvillian flow),
whereas the second accounts for the random switching. At stationarity, limt→∞ p(N, ξ, t) = p∗(N, ξ) and limt→∞ J(N, ξ, t) =
J∗(N, ξ), with ∂tp∗(N, ξ) = −∂NJ∗(N, ξ) = 0, which implies ∂N (J∗(N, ξ) + J∗(N,−ξ)) = 0. With the (natural) zero-
current boundary conditions at N∗± [43], i.e. J
∗(N, ξ) = 0, we find a simple relationship between the PDFs in each of the
environmental states:
p∗(N, ξ) = −
(F(N,−ξ)
F(N, ξ)
)
p∗(N,−ξ). (S6)
With this relation, ∂NJ
∗(N,−ξ) = 0 gives
0 = ∂N [F(N,−ξ)p∗(N,−ξ)] + ν
[
1
F(N,−ξ) +
1
F(N, ξ)
]
(F(N,−ξ)p∗(N,−ξ)) .
Combined with equation (S6), this readily yields p∗(N, ξ) ∝ ±g(N)/F(N, ξ), where
g(N) = exp
[
−ν
∫ N
dm
{
1
F−(m) +
1
F+(m)
}]
=
[
(N∗+ −N)(N −N∗−)
N2
] ν
1+q
, (S7)
and F± are defined by eq. (10). The joint stationary PDF giving the probability density ofN in each environmental state is thus
explicitly given by
p∗(N, ξ) =
Z
ξF(N, ξ) g(N) =
Z
ξF(N, ξ)
[
(N∗+ −N)(N −N∗−)
N2
] ν
1+q
, (S8)
where Z is the normalization constant. In figure S1, we compare the predictions of the joint PDF p∗(N, ξ) with the histograms
of the population size obtained from SSA results, verifying that the PDMP description aptly reproduces the location and number
of peaks that characterize the quasi-stationary distribution of N (see also [39, 53]).
The marginal stationary PDF p∗(N) = p∗(N, ξ) + p∗(N,−ξ) is thus p∗(N) ∝ [(1/F+(N)) − (1/F−(N))] g(N), which
yields the explicit expression (S3).
It is also useful to notice that, at stationarity, the probability that the PDMP (9) is in the environmental state ξ, given a
population size N is given by [12]
p∗(ξ|N) = −ξF(−ξ,N)∑
ξ=±1 ξF(ξ,N)
. (S9)
SM-IV. ASSESSMENTOF ACCURACY OF FORMULAS FOR THE FIXATION PROBABILITY
A central point of our analysis is the formula to compute the fixation probability of S (see section III.C.1 in the main text), φ,
with the formula [39]
φ ≃
∫ K+
K−
(
e−Ns(1−x0) − e−Ns
1− e−Ns
)
p∗ν/s(N) dN, when b = 0 (no public good production). (S10)
When s = O(1), the assumption of a timescale separation between N and x that underpins the derivation of equation (S10) is
no longer valid. As a consequence, the relative deviations between the predictions of eq. (14) and the SSA results for φ increase
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with s, as shown in figure S2. To quantify the accuracy of equation (S10), we have compared its predictions with the simulation
results of 106 realizations obtained for different values of ν and s spanning between 0 and 0.25, recording the SSA fixation
probability φsim. For each combination of parameters (different colors in Figure S2), we determined the theoretical prediction
φth from eq. (S10) and the percentage deviation between it and the simulation result ∆φ = 100|φth − φsim|/φsim. As figure S2
shows, theoretical results reproduce simulations for small s, with relative deviations below 10%. Discrepancies increase more
and more as the selection intensity is increased towards s = O(1) (when s > 0.1, in figure S2). The approximation underpinning
(S10) is therefore valid in the regime s≪ 1, which is the regime of weak selection pressure on which we focus (see main text),
and deteriorates as s approaches s = O(1).
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FIG. S2: (a) φ vs. s when b = 0, with ν = 0.1 (◦, yellow), ν = 1 (∇, green), ν = 10 (⋄, blue). (b) Accuracy of formula as function of s with
b = 0, measured as the relative deviations from simulation results for φ with the same ν as in (b), see text for details. In both panels, symbols
are from simulations (106 runs in (a)) and solid lines are from eq. (14). Other parameters are (K+,K−, x0) = (450, 50, 0.5)
Within the regime s ≪ 1, we have similarly assessed the accuracy of equation (14) for different switching rates ν. We
simulated 104 realizations of the system, for different values of s, and 100 values ν between 0.001 and 10 and computed the
percentage deviation ∆φ(ν) as explained above. Dots in figure S3(a) are thus based on φsim obtained by sampling 10
4 SSA
realizations; they represent the value of ∆φ(ν) recorded at each value of ν, with different colors signaling different values of
s (red for 0.05, cyan for 0.02). The dots scatter uniformly, indicating no systematic trend in the deviation. For s = 0.02, we
observe deviations between 0 and 8% when s = 0.02, with an average (solid line) of 2% and standard deviation (shaded area)
≈ 2%; for s = 0.05 (red), deviations are between 0 and 13%, with average 4% and standard deviation 2.5%.
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FIG. S3: (a) Percentage deviation ∆φ between simulation and theory vs. ν, for b = 0 with s = 0.02 (cyan) and s = 0.05 (red). Dots
represent the percentage distance between prediction and simulated value for each ν, solid lines denote the average of the dots, shaded areas
the standard deviation around the average. (b) Same as in panel (a) but for (s, b) = (0.02, 0.2) (blue) and (0.05, 2) (red). Other parameters
are (K+,K−, x0) = (450, 50, 0.5).
For the case with public good production, we have used an effective approach and obtained the following expression (15) for
the fixation probability of S (see section III.C.2) which, with eq. (S13), reads [39]:
φq =
∫ (1+q)K+
(1+q)K−
(
e−Ns(1−x0) − e−Ns
1− e−Ns
)
p∗ν/s,q(N) dN , when b > 0 (public good production). (S11)
This expression also builds on a timescale separation between an effective population size and x. Besides the breakdown of
the timescale separation when s = O(1), the accuracy of the approximation φ ≃ φq deteriorates for higher values of b and/or
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s, because the fixation of S then becomes increasingly unlikely, see figure 3(a), which limits the accuracy with which q(b) is
determined and hence the predictions of equation (15).
Figure S3(b) shows the results for the percentage deviation of the predictions of equation (S11), using the appropriate values
of the effective parameter q(b) (excluding a few outliers), and φsim obtained from 10
4 SSA realizations. For s = 0.02, b = 0.2
(blue), ∆φ is between 0 and 8%, with average 3% and a standard deviation of 2%. For s = 0.05, b = 2 (red), we observe
larger and more scattered ∆φ between 0 and 28%, with average 12% and standard deviation 7%. While a deterioration of the
approximation when s and b are increased can explain the increase in the average∆φ, higher values of s and b also cause lower
fixation probabilities for S, see figure 3(a). The corresponding values of φ are small which results in noisier values of φsim and
∆φ, as shown by red data in figure S3.
Overall, the above analyis confirms that our approach is able to predict the fixation probability φ in the regime of weak
selection intensity (0 < s ≪ 1), both when b = 0 and 0 < b = O(1), with a remarkable accuracy of a few percent over a vast
range of values ν.
SM-V. FIXATION IN THE FITNESS-DEPENDENTMORAN PROCESS & MEAN FIXATION TIME UNDER SWITCHING
CARRYING CAPACITY
A. Fixation in the fitness-dependent Moran process
To study the fixation properties of the system, we have used the properties of the fitness-dependent Moran Process (fdMP)
outlined in section III.B of the main text [22, 23, 60, 65]. In a population of large but finite and constant size N , the fixation
properties under weak selection of the fdMP can be inferred from the backward Fokker-Planck equation associated with the
generator [22, 23, 41, 65, 68, 69]
G(x)|N = g(x) x(1 − x)
N
[
−Ns d
dx
+
d2
dx2
]
, where g(x) = 1 + bx. (S12)
For an initial fraction x0 of S individuals, the fixation probability φ(x0)|N of S obeys G(x)|Nφ(x)|N = 0, with φ(1)|N = 1
and φ(0)|N = 0 (absorbing boundaries at x = 0, 1). Yielding the result
φ(x0)|N = e
−Ns(1−x0) − e−Ns
1− e−Ns , (S13)
given as equation (S13) in the main text.
The generator (S12) can also be used to study when fixation occurs in the fdMP in the realm of the diffusion approximation
[22, 23, 41, 65]. Quantities of particular interest, are the unconditional mean fixation time (MFT)—which is the average time to
reach any of the absorbing states, here either x = 0 or x = 1—aswell as the conditionalMFTs—themean time to reach a specific
absorbing boundary. The unconditional MFT is obtained by solving G(x0)|N T (x0)|N = −1 subject to T (0)|N = T (1)|N =
0 [22, 41, 68]. The conditional MFT to reach x = 1 is denoted by T S(x0)|N , while TF (x0)|N is the (conditional) MFT
conditioned to reach x = 0. The MFTs and the fixation probabilities are related by T (x)|N = φT S(x0)|N + (1− φ)TF (x0)|N .
Explicit, but unwieldy, expressions for the MFTs in the fdMP can be obtained [22, 41, 65, 68], e.g. the unconditional MFT in
the case b = 0 reads
T (1/2)|N = 1
s
{
(1− 2φ(1/2)|N)(ln(Ns) + γ) + e−Ns2 Ei
(
Ns
2
)
− eNs2 Ei
(
−Ns
2
)
+ eNsφ(1/2)|NEi(−Ns)− e−Ns(1− φ(1/2)|N )Ei(Ns)
}
, (S14)
where γ ≈ 0.577... is the Euler-Mascheroni constant, and Ei(z) = ∫∞−z dz e−zz is the exponential integral. Hence, in the regime
where s ≪ 1, with Ns ≫ 1, and s(lnN)≪ 1 (with x0 is sufficiently separated from x = 0, 1), T (x0)|N ∼ (lnN)/s [22, 23,
65], with a subleading prefactor ∼ lnN . The conditional MFTs exhibit the same behavior T S/F (x0) ∼ T (x0) = O(1/s) to
leading order when s ≪ 1, see figure S4. A similar behavior also holds when b > 0 and s ≪ 1, with a subleading prefactor
that then depends (weakly) on the public good parameter b = O(1), specifically T (x0)|N ∼ (ln (N −O(b)))/s, as confirmed
by figure S4. The public good parameter b, in fact, reduces the relaxation time of x, see equation (7), which results in a weak
reduction of the unconditional and MFTs with respect to the case with b = 0, see also figure S4(b,c). The most relevant point for
our purposes, is the fact that the unconditional MFT of the fdMP scales as O(1/s) to leading order when s ≪ 1 and Ns ≫ 1,
and so do the conditional MFTs, in both cases b = 0 and b > 0.
Results (S12)-(S14) can be used to obtain the fixation properties of fdMP in a population of finite size subject to a constant
carrying capacity K . This is done by setting N = K in (S12)-(S14), which neglects the rare/unlikely early fixation events
occurring during the exponential growth phase (assuming x0 = 1/2).
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FIG. S4: (a) MFT T |N vs. s for the fdMP, given by T |N = φ|NT
S|N + (1 − φ|N)T
F |N . In the case b = 0 (blue), this corresponds to
equation (S15). (b) TS|N vs. s for the fdMP, from the solution of the appropriate equation associated with the generator (S12). (c) T
F |N vs.
s for the fdMP, obtained as TS . The population in the fdMP is of constant size N = 100 and the effect of the public good parameter b is to
reduce the relaxation time of x, and thus to lower all the MFTs with respect to the case b = 0. However, the MFTs always scale as O(1/s) to
leading order when s≪ 1. In all panels, and b = 0 (blue), b = 0.2 (pink), b = 2 (yellow), x0 = 0.5.
B. Mean fixation times with a switching carrying capacity
In a population subject to a randomly switching carrying capacity, with no public good production, the size and growth rate
are independent of the composition. As explained in Ref. [39, 53], when b = 0, the conditional and unconditional MFTs admit
the same scaling to leading order when s ≪ 1, i.e. T S/F (x0) ∼ T (x0) = O(1/s), and we can use the approach outlined in
Section III.C.1, to compute [53]
T (x0) ≃
∫ K+
K−
T (x0)|Np∗ν/s(N) dN. (S15)
Figure S5(a) shows that the predictions of this formula (blue line) agree extremely well with SSA results (⋄). This confirms
that under weak selection and b = 0, the unconditional MFT scales as in the fdMP, i.e. T (x0) = O(1/s) when s ≪ 1 and
〈K〉s≫ 1. This implies that after t & 1/s fixation is likely to have occurred, and that the population size is at quasi-stationarity
when t ≫ 1/s. Quite remarkably, we also notice in figure S5(a) that even when s = O(1) there is a good agreement between
the predictions of eq. (S15) and SSA results.
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FIG. S5: (a) MFT T vs s. Symbols are from simulations (104 realizations) and the solid line shows T (x0) given by eq. (S15) in the case
b = 0. (b) TS vs s. Solid lines are the results of equation (S16) . (c) TF vs s. The solid line is the result of equation (S17). In all panels,
ν = 0.1 and b = 0 (blue, ⋄), b = 0.2 (pink, ◦), b = 2 (yellow,△), other parameters are (K−,K+, x0) = (50, 450, 0.5).
In the case b > 0, the evolution of the population size and its composition are coupled. As discussed in the main text, S is
less likely to fixate when b is increased, and the population size at fixation depends on which species takes over (the population
size is typically larger when S fixates). On the other hand, according to eq. (7), increasing b reduces the relaxation time of x.
Since these two effects balance each other, we expect the effect of b > 0 to be even weaker in the switching environment than
in the fdMP with constant population size. Having seen that b has a weak effect on the MFTs, we anticipate that the MFTs with
a switching carrying capacity exhibit a similar behavior as those of the fdMP. To verify this picture and figure out on which
timescale fixation occurs when b > 0, we have considered the fixation of S and F separately by studying their conditional
MFTs [53]. For this, we can attempt to generalize the approach used in the case b = 0 and consider the averages over the
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FIG. S6: (a) Average number of switches prior to fixation vs. s for ν = 1 is shown to be of order O(ν/s) when s≪ 1. (b) Average number
of switches prior to fixation rescaled by a factor 1/ν vs. s for ν = 0.1 (circles), ν = 1 (downside triangles) and ν = 10 (diamonds). In both
panels, simulation results are averaged over 104 realizations. Parameters are (K+, K−, b) = (450, 50, 0). In panel (b), the different symbols
essentially collapse onto a single curve showing that, on average, the number of switches prior to fixation increase linearly with ν and mostly
independent of the population size, see text.
conditional stationary PDFs p∗ν/s,b(N) and p
∗
ν/s(N) obtained from (S3) with q = b and q = 0, i.e.
T S(x0) ≃
∫ (1+b)K+
(1+b)K−
T S(x0)|Np∗ν/s,b(N)dN , (S16)
TF (x0) ≃
∫ K+
K−
TF (x0)|Np∗ν/s(N)dN , (S17)
T (x0) ≃ φq(b)T S(x0) + (1− φq(b))TF (x0) , (S18)
where T S/F (x0)|N are the conditional MFTs of the fdMP with b > 0. A clear limitation of formula (S16) and (S17) stems from
the fact that p∗ν/s,b(N) and p
∗
ν/s(N) provide a good approximation of the N -QSD in the quasi-stationary state that is reached
after t≫ 1/s, see Ref. [62], i.e. well after fixation has typically occurred. However, since the population size and the parameter
b only yield subleading contributions to the MFTs of the fdMP when s≪ 1, we expect that formula (S16)-(S18) are still able to
capture how the MFTs scale to leading order under weak selection intensity. The comparison of SSA results for the MFTs with
b > 0 reported in figure S5, and their comparison with those of figure (S4) confirm this picture. Since the b-dependence of the
MFTs in figure (S4) is clearly subleading, we can simplify the evaluation of (S16) by setting g ≡ 1 + b (and similarly g ≡ 1 in
(S17)). As shown in figure (S5)(b), this does not affect the leading behavior of T S .
Figures S5(b,c) show that the simplified formula (S16) and (S17) indeed correctly predict that the conditional MFTs scale as
O(1/s) when s ≪ 1, even if, as expected, they overstimate the SSA results for T S and TF . Hence, equation (S18) predicts
that to leading order the uncoditional MFT scales asO(1/s), which is in good agreement with the SSA results reported in figure
S5(a). As s and b increase, the fixation of S becomes less likely and thus T (x0) ≃ TF (x0), as shown by figures S5(a) and (c).
We notice that SSA results reported in figure S5 confirm that the MFTs with randomly switching carrying capacity depend even
more weakly on the public good parameter b than in the fdMP where N is constant.
We therefore conclude that, under weak selection 1/〈K〉 ≪ s ≪ 1, and with b = O(1), the MFTs in the case b > 0 scale
as O(1/s). This means that the fixation in the public good scenario (b > 0) is likely to have occurred when t & 1/s, as in
the case b = 0. This also implies that, when b ≥ 0, the population size is most probably at quasi-stationarity when t ≫ 1/s,
and its composition consists then of only F or S individuals. These results thus indicate that, to leading order in 1/s (with
〈K〉s ≪ 1), the MFTs here scale as in the absence of external noise. Hence, while environmental noise has a significant effect
on the fixation probability (see Section III.C in the main text), its effect on the MFTs is much less important, as captured by the
formula (S16)-(S18). A consequence of these results is that the population experiences, on average, O(ν/s) switches prior to
fixation when b ≥ 0 and 1/〈K〉 ≪ s ≪ 1. In fact, the figure S6 confirms that the average number of switches prior to fixation
scales as 1/s to leading order when 1/〈K〉 ≪ s ≪ 1 in the case b = 0. In figure S6(b), we show that the average number
of switches prior to fixation increases linearly with ν, with simulation data for different values of ν essentially collapsing when
rescaled by a factor 1/ν. Since the population size greatly varies when ν changes, see, e.g. the videos in [62], the fact that the
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average number of switches increases simply linearly with ν is a strong indication of its weak dependence on the population
size, and is a further argument supporting the rescaling ν → ν/s in formula (14) and (15).
SM-VI. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATIONON THE PDMP APPROXIMATION AND THE “ECO-EVOLUTIONARYGAME”
A. PDMP approximation and average number of individuals
The analysis of the correlations between population size and its composition (Section IV.A), and that of the “eco-evolutionary
game” (Section IV.B), relies largely on properties of the average population size at quasi-stationarity given by
〈N〉∗ν,b = φb〈N〉∗ν,b + (1− φb)〈N〉∗ν,0 = (1 + b)φb〈N〉∗ ν
1+b ,0
+ (1 − φb)〈N〉∗ν,0 , (S19)
where φb is the fixation probability of species S under a public good parameter b, within what in the main text is referred to as
the “PDMP approximation”. This approximation consists of averaging the population size N over the marginal PDF (S3) of the
PDMP (9).
To derive equation (S19), which coincides with equation (16) of the main text, we first notice that 〈N〉∗ν,b consists of the
average population size conditioned to the fixation of F and S, i.e. 〈N〉∗ν,b = 〈NF 〉∗ν,b + 〈NS〉∗ν,b. The fixation of F occurs with
probability φ˜b = 1− φb, and results in a global growth rate g = 1, yielding
〈NF 〉∗ν,b = 〈N |x = 0〉∗ν,b = φ˜b〈N〉∗ν,0 = φ˜b
∫ K+
K−
Np∗ν(N)dN, (S20)
where 〈N〉∗ν,0 is the quasi-stationary average population size when b = 0 and the integration is over p∗ν ≡ p∗ν,0 given by eq. (S3).
Similarly, the fixation of S occurs with probability φb, after which g = 1 + b, yielding
〈NS〉∗ν,b = 〈N |x = 1〉∗ν,b = φb〈N〉∗ν,b = φb
∫ (1+b)K+
(1+b)K−
Np∗ν,b(N)dN = (1 + b)φb〈N〉∗ ν
1+b ,0
. (S21)
The last equality is obtained by performing the change of variableN → N/(1 + b) and allows us to express 〈N〉∗ν,b in terms of
the average when b = 0. Putting everything together, we obtain eq. (16):
〈N〉∗ν,b = (1 + b)φb〈N〉∗ ν
1+b ,0
+ (1 − φb)〈N〉∗ν,0
≃ (1 + b)φq(b)
∫ K+
K−
Np∗ν
1+b
(N) dN + (1 − φq(b))
∫ K+
K−
Np∗ν(N) dN, (S22)
where in the last line we have used the approximation φb ≃ φq(b) given by equation (15). Figure 3(b) shows that predictions of
〈N〉∗ν,b obtained with this approach are as close to simulation results as their counterparts obtained by averaging over the PDF
obtained within the linear noise approximation of section V (see also section SM-VII below). It is clear from (15) that 〈N〉∗ν,b is
an increasing function of b since 〈N〉∗ν,0 is a decreasing function of ν [66].
In Section IV, we have often considered the limiting regimes of very fast/slow switching, ν → ∞, 0, in which the analytical
formula greatly simplify. To obtain these simplified expressions, it suffices to notice that∫ K+
K−
Np∗ν(N)dN =
{
K when ν →∞
〈K〉 when ν → 0
Hence, when ν ≫ 1, we have 〈NF 〉∗ν,b → (1 − φb)K and 〈NS〉∗ν,b → (1 + b)φbK. Similarly, when ν ≪ s, we have
〈NF 〉∗ν,b → (1−φb)〈K〉 and 〈NS〉∗ν,b → (1+ b)φb〈K〉. Hence, from (16) and using φ ≃ φq(b) we obtain the average population
size in the limiting regimes:
〈N〉∗ν,b =

[
1 + bφ
(∞)
q(b)
]
K when ν →∞[
1 + bφ
(0)
q(b)
]
〈K〉 when ν → 0.
(S23)
The limiting behavior reported as dashed lines in figures 3(b) and 4(b) can readily be obtained from equations (S23).
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B. Best conditions for cooperation in the eco-evolutionary game
A finite well-mixed population of constant size is the natural setting of evolutionary game theory (EGT). The notion of
evolutionary stability is central to EGT since an evolutionary stable strategy, when adopted by a population, cannot be invaded
and replaced by an alternative strategy. For a population with two possible strategies, one is evolutionary stable if it satisfies
the so-called invasion and replacement conditions [24, 67]. As a result, the sole fact that one strategy has a higher fitness than
another does not guarantee that it is evolutionary stable since an individual of the other type may have a better chance to fixate
the population.
For the model considered here, in a finite and static population, the strain F has always a higher fitness than S, and the
fixation probability of S vanishes exponentially with the population size, see equation (S13). In a finite and static population, F
is therefore evolutionary stable, and in this sense always superior to S.
The situation is radically different in the eco-evolutionary game considered here since the population continues to evolve in
a fluctuating environment even after fixation, and the notions of non-invadibility / non-replacement are no longer suitable to
measure the species evolutionary success:
As discussed in Section IV.B of the main text, even if S has always a lower fitness and a lesser chance to fixate than F , its
occasional fixation can prove very rewarding since it allows cooperators to establish a large community of S individuals (of a
size that can be significantly larger than the size of an average community of F individuals). In the context of the interpretation
of the eco-evolutionary game in terms of a biologically motivated metapopulation of non-interacting communities, see Section
IV.B of the main text, we have proposed to measure the success of S and F in this eco-evolutionary game by computing the
difference between the expected long-term number of individuals ∆Sν,b and ∆Fν,b, compared to the b = 0 case. ∆Sν,b and
∆Fν,b thus serve as expected payoffs in our eco-evolutionary game. In the PDMP approximation, we can use our effective
approach (see section III.C.2) and equations (S20) and (S21), to obtain
∆Sν,b = (1 + b)φq(b)
∫ K+
K−
Np∗ν
1+b
(N) dN − φ0
∫ K+
K−
Np∗ν(N) dN (S24)
∆Fν,b = (φ0 − φq(b))
∫ K+
K−
Np∗ν(N) dN , (S25)
where p∗ν(N) is readily obtained by setting q = 0 in equation (S3). In the limiting regimes ν →∞, 0, with (S23), we obtain
∆Sν,b =

[
(1 + b)φ
(∞)
q(b) − φ
(∞)
0
]
K when ν →∞[
(1 + b)φ
(0)
q(b) − φ
(0)
0
]
〈K〉 when ν → 0.
and ∆Fν,b =

[
φ
(∞)
0 − φ(∞)q(b)
]
K when ν →∞[
φ
(0)
0 − φ(0)q(b)
]
〈K〉 when ν → 0.
(S26)
As shown in figure 5,∆Sν,b is non-monotonic in b and has a maximum for b = b
∗. This is then the optimal value of b for the
cooperating strain S (given s, ν, K±). Figure S7(a) shows the dependence of the optimal value b∗ = b∗(ν, s) on ν, for different
intensities of the selection pressure s. Clearly, b∗ = b∗(ν, s) exhibits a complex, non-monotonic, dependence on ν and decreases
when s increases, in a similar fashion to bc (see main text). In figure S7(a), symbols are from simulations and the lines have been
obtained from evaluating the maximum of equation (S24).
Figure S7(b) shows∆Sν,b∗/〈N〉∗ν,0: the optimal payoff for cooperators divided by the long-time average population at b = 0.
In other words, it shows how much bigger is, on average, the best-performing cooperating population, compared to the average
population at b = 0. For sufficiently low s, e.g. for s = 0.02 (blue), the public good can make the average number of S
individuals be up to 12%− 25% larger than the average population at b = 0 (∆Sν,b∗/〈N〉∗ν,0 ≈ 0.12− 0.25 across all values of
ν). Figure S7(b) corresponds to results at quasi-stationarity, i.e. after fixation has occurred (with a smaller probability for S than
F ) and therefore shows the actual long-term eco-evolutionary payoff for cooperation: In the optimal conditions, the S strain can
gain a significant benefit from the production of a public good.
As discussed in Section IV.B of the main text, there are conditions under which S receives a higher expected payoff than F in
the sense that ∆Sν,b > ∆Fν,b. When this happens, cooperating is not only beneficial but is also advantageous for S. We have
considered that for given parameters (ν, s), it is best to cooperate for the production of a public good with benefit parameter b
when the following two conditions are satisfied: (a) ∆Sν,b > ∆Fν,b; (b) b = b
∗(ν, s) < β(ν, s). These conditions ensure (a)
that S receives a higher payoff than F , and (b) that S receives the maximum payoff under the switching rate ν and selection
strength s. On the other hand, species F always outperforms S when b > β(ν, s) since it then receives a higher expected payoff
than S, with∆Fν,b that is an increasing function of b for all values of ν and s, see figure 5(c).
As shown in figure 6(b) the phases (ii), (0 < ∆Sν,b < ∆Fν,b) and (iii) (∆Sν,b > ∆Fν,b) are separated by the value b = β(ν, s)
at which∆Sν,β = ∆Fν,β , defined as by the solution of
1
1 + β
(
2φ0
φq(β)
− 1
)
=
∫K+
K−
Np∗ ν
1+β
dN∫ K+
K−
Np∗ν dN
. (S27)
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FIG. S7: (a) Optimal public good benefit parameter for the cooperating b∗ vs ν for s = 0.02 (blue), s = 0.03 (orange), and s = 0.05 (green).
Symbols are results from simulations and solid lines are from (25) (b)∆Sν,b∗/〈N〉
∗
ν,0 vs. ν, obtained gives the highest payoff received by S
by producing the public good at optimal value b = b∗(ν, s) obtained from (25) for s = 0.02 (blue), s = 0.03 (orange), s = 0.05 (green), see
below and main text. Other parameters are (K+,K−, x0) = (450, 50, 0.5).
It is noteworthy that in the limiting switching regimes ν ≫ 1 and ν ≪ s, this equation greatly simplifies. In fact, using (S23),
equation (S27) becomes (1 + β/2)φ
(∞,0)
q(β) = φ
(∞,0)
0 when ν ≫ 1 and ν ≪ s, respectively. Hence, the corresponding payoffs
along b = β(ν, s) are ∆Sν,β = ∆Fν,β = (φ
(∞)
0 − φ(∞)β )K ≃ βφ(∞)q(β)K/2 when ν ≫ 1 and ∆Sν,β = ∆Fν,β ≃ βφ
(0)
q(β)〈K〉/2
when ν ≪ s, yielding ∆Sν,β/〈N〉∗ν,0 = ∆Fν,β/〈N〉∗ν,0 ≃ βφ(∞,0)q(β) /2 in both limiting regimes. It is however important to
remember that in general φβ ≃ φq(β) depends nontrivially on ν and s, and can be either an increasing or decreasing function of
ν, see figures 2(a) and 3(a).
While the choice made here on how to measure the success of S and F is arguably the most natural, we could have also
considered other variants. For instance, we could have considered that the best conditions to cooperate for the production of the
public good would be: S should receive a higher payoff than F , condition (a) as above, and, S should maximize the difference
of payoffs∆Sν,b−∆Fν,b (instead of condition (b)). This would lead to an optimal value of the public good benefit b˜ that would
generally differ from b∗ especially at low switching rate (see figure 5(c)). While this alternative definition of the optimal payoff
for S would lead to quantitative differences with the results reported in figure 6(b), the main qualitative features discussed here
and in section IV.B would remain the same.
SM-VII. EFFECT OF INTERNAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL NOISE ON POPULATION SIZE DISTRIBUTION – LINEAR
NOISE APPROXIMATION ABOUT THE PDMP PREDICTIONS
The PDMP approximation of the N -QSD can reproduce the number and location of its peaks, but fails to capture the width
of the distribution about the peaks and its accurate skewness, see, e.g., figure S1. In this section, we derive the linear noise
approximation (LNA) of theN -QSD used in Section V to account for the demographic fluctuations about the PDMP predictions
[12].
After the fixation of species S,NS = N andNF = 0, and the transition rates of the underpinning birth-death process become
T+S = (1 + b)N , T
−
S = N
2/K(t), and T±F = 0. Similarly, after species F ’s fixation, NF = N and NS = 0, and the transition
rates (3) become T+F = N , T
−
F = N
2/K(t), with T±S = 0. To deal simultaneously with the ecological dynamics arising after the
fixation of either species, it is convenient to define the auxiliary stochastic logistic processN
T+−−→ N+1 and N T
−
−−→ N −1,
with symmetric dichotomous Markov noise ξ(t) ∈ {−1,+1} and randomly switching carrying capacity defined by equations
(3) and (4). This stochastic process is defined by the transition rates:
T+ = (1 + q)N, T− =
N2
K(t)
= N2
[
1
K − ξ(t)
(
1
K −
1
K+
)]
, with q =
{
b after fixation of S
0 after fixation of F.
(S28)
As explained in section V.B of the main text, it is convenient to work with the continuousMarkov process {n ≡ N/Ω, ξ} defined
by
n
T +−→ n+Ω−1, n T
−
−→ n− Ω−1, with ξ ν−→ −ξ, (S29)
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with Ω = 〈K〉 [70] and
ψ ≡ lim
Ω→∞
N/Ω, κ ≡ K/Ω and kξ ≡
{
k+ = K+/Ω if ξ = 1
k− = K−/Ω if ξ = −1.
Therefore, the transition rates for the process {n, ξ} are
T +(ψ, ξ) = (1 + q)ψ and T −(ψ, ξ) = ψ2 {κ−1 − ξ(κ−1 − k−1+ )} . (S30)
It is also useful to define vξ, associated with the deterministic flows of {n, ξ}, and uξ associated with the diffusive flows:
vξ(ψ) ≡ T + − T − = F(Ωψ, ξ)
Ω
=
ψ
kξ
(
ψ∗ξ − ψ
)
, and uξ(ψ) ≡ T + + T − = ψ
kξ
(
ψ∗ξ + ψ
)
, (S31)
with ψ∗ξ = (1 + q)kξ. It is worth noting that vξ(ψ) > 0 when ξ = +1 and vξ(ψ) < 0 when ξ = −1.
When the environment is static (K± = K), with kξ = k, vξ = v and uξ = u, the LNA consists of performing a van Kampen
system size expansion of the underlying master equation, which yields the Fokker-Planck equation (FPE) for the probability
density π(η, t) [68, 69]:
∂tπ(η, t) = −∂η [ηv′(ψ)π(η, t)] + u
2
∂2ηπ(η, t), (S32)
where v′ = dv/dψ and π(η, t) is the PDF of the fluctuations {η(t)} about the mean-field trajectory ψ˙ = v(ψ).
Here, the environment varies stochastically by randomly switching between two states and we are interested in the weak
fluctuations about the PDMP trajectory ψ(t). The process {n, ξ} is thus analyzed in terms of a “pseudo-Fokker-Planck equation”
which consists of an FPE, accounting for the internal noise, supplemented by terms arising from environmental stochasticity via
the PDMP {ψ(t)} defined by the stochastic differential equation
ψ˙ = vξ(ψ) , (S33)
that is equivalent to (9) and whose joint PDF is readily obtained from (S8): π∗ν,q(ψ, ξ) = Ωp
∗(Ωψ, ξ). Within the LNA,
to account for the weak fluctuations about ψ up to linear order in η, we obtain the following pseudo-FPE for the PDF
πν,q(ψ, η, ξ, t) ≡ π(ψ, η, ξ) of the process (S1):
∂tπ(ψ, η, ξ) = −∂η
[
ηv′ξ(ψ)π(ψ, η, ξ)
]
+
uξ
2
∂2ηπ(ψ, η, ξ)
− ∂ψ [vξ(ψ)π(ψ, η, ξ)] − ν [π(ψ, η, ξ) − π(ψ, η,−ξ)] , (S34)
where, for notational simplicity, in this section we drop the time dependence and the ν, q subscripts in the PDFs by writing
π(η, ξ) and π(ψ, η, ξ) instead of πν,q(η, ξ, t) and πq(ψ, η, ξ, t), etc. On the RHS of eq. (S34), the first line corresponds to a
usual FPE with a drift term −∂η [. . . ] and a diffusion coefficient uξ, while in the second line one recognizes the Liouvillian
contribution−∂ψ [vξ(ψ)π(ψ, η, ξ)] and terms from random switching.
To determine the stationary Gaussian probability density π∗(η|ψ, ξ) characterizing the demographic fluctuations η aboutψ(t),
we notice that π(ψ, η, ξ) = π(η|ψ, ξ)π(ψ, ξ). As explained in the main text, we then assume that demographic fluctuations
about ψ are the same in each environmental state ξ = ±1, and write π(η|ψ, ξ) = π(η|ψ) [12]. With this assumption, we can set
∂t(π
∗(η, ψ, ξ) + π∗(η, ψ,−ξ)) = 0 and use equation (S34) to obtain
0 = − [π∗(ξ|ψ)v′ξ(ψ) + π∗(−ξ|ψ)v′−ξ(ψ)] ∂η [ηπ∗(η|ψ)] + 12 [π∗(ξ|ψ)uξ(ψ) + π∗(−ξ|ψ)u−ξ(ψ)] ∂2ηπ∗(η|ψ), (S35)
where we have also used π∗(ψ, ξ) = π∗(ψ)π∗(ξ|ψ) and the zero-current boundary condition ∑ξ vξπ∗(ψ, ξ) = 0. At the
PDMP level, equation (S9) expresses the probability of being in the environmental state ξ given that the population has size N .
Hence, upon substituting π∗(ξ|ψ) = −ξv−ξ/(
∑
ξ=±1 ξvξ), equation (S35) yields the stationary probability density π
∗(η|ψ) of
an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process [68, 69]. In other words, π∗(η|ψ) is a Gaussian with zero mean and variance
u−(ψ)v+(ψ) − u+(ψ)v−(ψ)
v−(ψ)v′+(ψ) − v+(ψ)v′−(ψ)
= ψ, (S36)
where we have used equation (S31), and the subscripts± refer to ξ = ±1. With equation (S36), we find the stationary Gaussian
probability density of the fluctuations about ψ:
π∗(η|ψ) = e
− η2
2ψ
√
2πψ
. (S37)
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Within the LNA, see eq. (25), the marginal quasi-stationary PDF of the process {N(t), ξ(t)} defined by (S28) therefore is
p∗LNA,ν,q(N) =
π∗(n)
Ω
=
∑
ξ=±1
∫ ∫
dψdη π∗(η|ψ)π∗(ψ, ξ) δ
(
n− ψ − η√
Ω
)
. (S38)
Upon substituting (S37) and π∗(ψ, ξ) = Ωp∗ν,q(Ωψ, ξ) obtained from (S8), into (S38), we obtain the LNA-PDF of the process
{N(t), ξ(t)}. When b = 0, the marginal LNA-PDF p∗LNA,0(N) in the case of the pure resource competition is obtained from
π∗(n) with q = 0 and reads
p∗LNA,ν,0(N) ∝
∫
dη e−η
2/[2(n−η/√Ω)](
n− η√
Ω
)3/2 (
k+ −
(
n− η√
Ω
))

{
k+ −
(
n− η√
Ω
)}{(
n− η√
Ω
)
− k−
}
(
n− η√
Ω
)2

ν
+
∫
dη e−η
2/[2(n−η/√Ω)](
n− η√
Ω
)3/2 ((
n− η√
Ω
)
− k−
)

{
k+ −
(
n− η√
Ω
)}{(
n− η√
Ω
)
− k−
}
(
n− η√
Ω
)2

ν
, (S39)
where n = N/Ω, k± = K±/Ω and the proportional factor is the normalization constant. In the public good scenario, b > 0, the
F -conditional LNA-PDF is p∗LNA,0(N) while PDF conditioned on fixation of species S (but unconditioned on ξ) is proportional
to π∗(n) with q = b, i.e. it is given by
p∗LNA,ν,b(N) ∝
∫
dη e−η
2/[2(n−η/√Ω)](
n− η√
Ω
)3/2 (
ψ∗+ −
(
n− η√
Ω
))

{
ψ∗+ −
(
n− η√
Ω
)}{(
n− η√
Ω
)
− ψ∗−
}
(
n− η√
Ω
)2

ν
1+b
+
∫
dη e−η
2/[2(n−η/
√
Ω)](
n− η√
Ω
)3/2 ((
n− η√
Ω
)
− ψ∗−
)

{
ψ∗+ −
(
n− η√
Ω
)}{(
n− η√
Ω
)
− ψ∗−
}
(
n− η√
Ω
)2

ν
1+b
, (S40)
where ψ∗+ = (1 + b)k+ and ψ
∗
− = (1 + b)k−.
The comparison between the LNA-PDFs and the N−QSD is shown in figures 7 and 8 of the main text, where a remarkable
agreement is found when b = 0 and b > 0. However, as mentioned in the main text, some small deviations are observed in
figure 8(a), at low switching rate, near the peak of small intensity when b > 0. The possible reasons for these small deviations
are multiple: When ν ≪ 1, the population near the peaks of weak intensity is of size N ≈ (1 + b)K±, and the assumption
π(η|ψ, ξ) ≃ π(η|ψ,−ξ) on which our LNA analysis is based may not be necessarily valid since the fluctuations in the state
ξ = −1 (with N ≈ (1 + b)K− and b = 2) may be noticeably stronger than those in the state ξ = +1 (where N ≈ (1 + b)K+).
Furthermore, the peak in question is associated with the fixation of species S for b = 2 in a population of rather large size
≈ (1 + b)K+, an event which occurs with a small probability that may be beyond the reach of the LNA. Moreover, the effective
theory yielding the approximation φ ≃ φq is based on the behavior at high switching rate and may be less accurate when ν ≪ 1
than in the regimes of intermediate and fast switching.
